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COMMENTS
FEDERAL COMMON LAW REMEDIES
UNDER THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970
Violations of a statutory norm often have legal consequences be-
yond those expressly provided by the statute. At Anglo-American
common law a statutory violation may be considered either evidence
of negligence or negligence per se, subjecting the violator to possible
tort liability.' The source of the right to recover in these cases is not
the statute but the common law. In other cases, state statutes are held
to give rise to "implied" causes of action in which the right to recover
is considered to be created by the statute itself and not by the courts.2
Similarly, Acts of Congress have long been held to create implied
federal causes of action.3 The federal courts, however, have not yet
utilized their power to create federal common law remedies for viola-
tions of a federal statute. The two rationales-statutory implication
and federal common law-differ in their effect on federal jurisdiction
and on the substantive right which is created. These differences are
1. See: Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARV. L. REV. 317 (1914);
Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation, 16 MINN. L. REV. 361
(1932); Williams, The Effect of Penal Legislation in the Law of Tort, 23 MODERN L.
REV. 233 (1960); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965).
2. In Washington, see Shermer v. Baker, 2 Wn. App. 845, 472 P.2d 589 (1970)
(holding that WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.010 (1959) impliedly creates a cause of action on
behalf of a seller of stock against one who induced the sale through fraudulent or mis-
leading statements or acts); Krystad v. Lau, 65 Wn.2d 803, 400 P.2d 72 (1965) (holding
that the policy provisions in Washington's little Norris-LaGuardia Act, WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 49.32.010-.910 (1959), impliedly create a cause of action on behalf of employees
dischaiged because of their union membership).
3. See Note, Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARV.
L. REV. 285 (1963); Note, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 1090 (1948); note 38, infra. A separate set
of problems, not discussed in this Comment, is presented when suit is brought in state
court to redress injuries caused by the violation of a federal statute. Three types of state
court suits may be distinguished. First, the defendant's conduct may have been inde-
pendently actionable under local law prior to the federal enactment. Concerning the
survival of local remedies in such cases see O'Neil, Public Regulation and Private
Rights of Action, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 231 (1964). Second, the federal norm may be incor-
porated into local standards of conduct. See, e.g., Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 291
U.S. 205 (1934). See generally Note, 66 HARv L.REv. 1498 (1953). Third, federal law
may create the cause of action. For a discussion of the power of a state to enforce fed-
eral rights see Note, State Remedies for Federally-Created Rights, 47 MINN. L. REV. 815
(1963); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 241 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
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manifest in the analysis of an important recent federal statute, the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. 4
Called by one of its sponsors "a safety bill of rights for close to 60
million workers," 5 the 1970 Act is a landmark in American labor his-
tory. In essence, the Act gives the Secretary of Labor authority to
promulgate and enforce standards for the enhancement of occupa-
tional safety and health. The immense importance of the Act derives
from its all-encompassing scope. The standards apply, with minor
exceptions, 6 to all employers and employees in any business which
affects commerce. 7 It is clear from the legislative history that Con-
gress intended to exercise its commerce power to the fullest extent
permitted by the Constitution. 8 Moreover, the occupational safety and
health standards which thus far have been promulgated give every
indication that the regulatory power vested by the Act in the Secretary
of Labor will be liberally utilized. 9 In the words of Congressman
Steiger, the Act "will affect virtually every man, woman, and child in
this country who holds a job or operates a business now or in the fu-
ture."10
Section 5 of the 1970 Act declares:"
(a) Each employer-
(1) shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place
of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are
causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his
employees;
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq. (Supp. 197 1). The legislative history of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970 has been compiled in SENATE COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND
PUBLIC WELFARE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT
OF 1970, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
The 1970 Act and its legislative history are discussed in Hornberger, Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970, 21 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Horn-
berger].
5. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at iii.
6. The 1970 Act does not apply to "working conditions of employees with respect to
which other federal agencies, and State agencies acting under section 2021 of Title 42
[section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954], exercise statutory authority to prescribe
or enforce standards or regulations affecting occupational safety or health." 29 U.S.C.§
653(b)(1) (Supp. 197 1).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 652 (Supp. 1971).
8. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 1216.
9. 36 Fed. Reg. 10466 (1971). Amendments to the first regulations and standards
are contained in 36 Fed. Reg. 15101-07, 15437-38, 18080-81, and 23207-08 (1971).
10. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 987.
11. 29 U.S.C. § 654 (Supp. 1971).
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(2) shall comply with occupational safety and health standards
promulgated under this Act.
(b) Each employee shall comply with occupational safety and health
standards and all rules, regulations, and orders issued pursuant to this
Act which are applicable to his own actions and conduct.
Subsection (a) of section 5 expressly was made enforceable by the as-
sessment of civil penalties by the Secretary of Labor, 12 subject to re-
view first by a three-man commission established by the Act 13 and
then by the United States Court of Appeals. 14 No other means of en-
forcement is mentioned in the Act for subsection (a), and none at all is
mentioned for subsection (b).
The purpose of this comment is to determine the extent to which
section 5 is enforceable by private suit in federal court. Of particular
concern is whether compensatory damages are available as a matter of
federal law to persons injured as a result of violations of the section.
The conclusion reached is that compensatory relief for violations of
subsection 5(a) is available under federal common law when recovery
is inadequate or unavailable under local law and the plaintiff's injuries
exceed $10,000 in value. In this way, the 1970 Act provides a needed
supplement to state workmen's compensation systems.' 5
It will be useful at the outset briefly to examine the requirements of
section 5. Subsections 5(a)(2) and 5(b), requiring compliance with
occupational safety and health standards promulgated by the Secre-
tary of Labor, require no explanation. The employer's "general duty"
in section 5(a)(1), however, is more ambiguous. The legislative history
of that provision sheds light on its meaning and also provides an in-
12. Id. § 659.
13. Id. § 659(c).
14. Id. § 660.
15. The Washington workmen's compensation statute is found in WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 51.04.010 et seq. (1961), as amended, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 51.04.020 et seq. (1971).
There are basically two situations in which recovery may be inadequate under state
law. First, the workmen's compensation statute may bar recovery in state courts yet
provide insufficient compensation under its own procedures. Second, the workmen's
compensation statute may not apply to the plaintiff who may nevertheless be frustrated
in state courts by the doctrines of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, fellow
servant, etc.
The Washington workmen's compensation statute was amended in 1971 to broaden
its mandatory coverage by including all employees except: certain domestic servants;
certain persons engaged temporarily in home repair; temporary employees whose work
is not in the course of business of their employers; certain persons sustained by religious
or charitable organizations; sole proprietors and partners; and agricultural laborers
paid less than $150 per year. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.12.020 (1971).
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sight into the concern for safety in employment which motivated the
1970 Act.
As originally reported out of the House Committee on Education
and Labor the general duty clause read: "Each employer shall furnish
to each of his employees employment and a place of employment
which is safe and healthful .... -16 The committee report explained
the provision as follows: 1
7
Under principles of common law, individuals are obliged to refrain
from actions which cause harm to others. Courts often refer to this as
a general duty to others. Statutes usually increase but sometimes mod-
ify this duty. The Committee believes that employers are equally
bound by this general and common duty to bring no adverse effects to
the life and health of their employees throughout the course of their
employment. Employers have primary control of the work environ-
ment and should insure that it is safe and healthful. Section 5(0)
merely restates that each employer shall furnish this degree of care.
Objections to the vagueness and breadth of the House committee
versions of section 5 were raised, 18 and Congressmen Steiger and
Sikes offered the following amendment which was later adopted by
the House: "Each employer shall furnish to each of his employees
employment and a place of employment which are free from any haz-
ards which are readily apparent and are causing or likely to cause
death or serious physical harm to his employees .... ,19 Congressman
Steiger argued on the House floor in support of his amendment as fol-
lows: 20
In tort law the general duty of care does not exist in isolation. It is sur-
rounded by other factors which sharply limit it, and thus give it real
meaning and practical application .... If we are to include any sort of
general-care duty in this legislation, Mr. Chairman, we should also
limit its terms so that persons upon whom it would impose a duty are
not unjustly held accountable for situations of which they are com-
pletely unaware.
Meanwhile the Senate passed its version of the bill which contained
16. H. R. 16785, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., § 5(1) (1970).
17. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 851.
18. E.g., id. at 884.
19. H. R. 19200, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., § 5(a) (1970).
20. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 992.
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the following phraseology of the employer's general duty: "Each em-
ployer shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place
of employment free from recognized hazards so as to provide safe and
healthfulworking conditions. ..." -21 The conference committee adopted
th6 House version, but substituted the Senate's "recognized hazard"
for the House's "readily apparent hazard. '2 2 The difference between
these phrases was explained by the unsuccessful House proponent of
a phrase similar to that in the Senate version, Congressman Daniels:
"A recognized hazard is a condition that is known to be hazardous,
and is known not necessarily by each and every individual employer
but is known taking into account the standard of knowledge in the
industry .... I am afraid that 'readily apparent'.. . means apparent
without investigation, even though a prudent employer would investigate
under the circumstances. 23
From the evolution of the general duty clause in the legislative his-
tory, it is clear that it is intended to be narrower than the common law
duty of care insofar as it is limited to hazards which are likely to cause
"death or serious physical harm," but that it nevertheless holds an
employer responsible for hazards of which he reasonably should be
aware, without regard to his actual awareness. Furthermore, while the
general duty was intended to cover situations for which no standard
has been promulgated, 24 it imposes no additional obligations upon
employers in situations to which a standard does apply. This is made
clear by the legislative history25 and by regulations which have been
promulgated by the Secretary of Labor. The regulations state: "An
employer who is in compliance with any standard in this part shall be
deemed to be in compliance with the requirement of section 5(a)(1) of
the Act, but only to the extent of the condition, practice, means,
method, operation, or process covered by the standard. '26
The following discussion of private remedies for violations of sec-
tion 5 is divided into two main parts. Part I is an analysis of the
21. S. 2193, 91st Cong., lstSess. § 5(a)(1) (1969).
22. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 1157.
23. Id. at 1007.
24. Id. at 150, 851-52. Contrary to these statements in the committee reports, the
1970 Act as ultimately enacted permits the Secretary to impose civil penalties for initial
and non-serious violations of the general duty clause. See Hornberger, supra note 4, at
6-8.
25. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 854.
26. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.5(0 (1971), printed in 36 Fed. Reg. 10468 (1971).
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sources and limits of federal judicial power to award private relief
under the 1970 Act, while Part II is an evaluation of the extent to
which the federal courts are bound to exercise this power in private
suits to enforce section 5.
I. THE POWER OF FEDERAL COURTS TO ENFORCE
SECTION 5
There are two aspects to the power of federal courts to enforce sec-
tion 5. First, the court must have jurisdiction of the case. Although
underlying limitations on the jurisdictional power of federal courts are
imposed by the Constitution, 27 the limitations of concern here are
those which have been superimposed by Congress. 28 Second, the court
must have power to award the remedy asked. While Congress has lim-
ited the power of federal courts to award remedies in other cases, 29
this Part is concerned with limitations on remedial power which, since
the existence of a remedy is a question of law,30 result from constitu-
tional restrictions on the power of federal courts to create decisional
law. Since the effect of statutory limitations on federal jurisdiction
depends upon the source of the remedy, the power of the federal
courts to remedy violations of section 5 will be discussed first, fol-
lowed by an examination of federal jurisdiction over private suits to
enforce that section.
A. Remedial Power
The usual source of federal remedial power is congressional author-
ization. While Congress often expressly creates private remedies, 31 it
may also do so by implication. The first instance of a private remedy
27. These limitations are concomitant upon the constitutional grant in Article III of
jurisdiction over only certain classes of cases.
28. Even in federal question cases the statutory grant of jurisdiction to the lower
federal courts has been construed as narrower than the nearly identical language in ar-
ticle III would allow. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF
JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 176-82 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
ALI STUDY].
29. See, e.g., note 91 and accompanying text, infra.
30. See text accompanying note 60, infra.
31. Perhaps the most prominent example of an enforcement scheme which expressly
includes private litigation is section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C § 15 (1970), which
grants the federal district courts jurisdiction of suits by persons injured by violations of
the anti-trust laws and permits the recovery of treble damages.
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implied from a federal statute was in Texas & Pacific Railway v.
Rigsby,32 where the employer's criminal violation of section 2 of the
Federal Safety Appliance Act33 -failing to provide secure handholds
beside ladders on railroad cars-entitled an injured employee to re-
cover damages. In the half-century since Rigsby the federal courts
have shown little hesitation in finding implied causes of action under
federal statutes. 34 Perhaps the best-known of recent cases is J. I. Case
Company v. Borak,35 in which the Supreme Court held that section
27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 193436 created an implied cause
of action in investors for violations of the proxy solicitation require-
ments of section 14(a) of the Act.3 7 While undoubtedly the largest
share of implied remedies have been awarded under statutes gover-
ning the securities market 38 and the employment relation,39 potentially
the most prolific statutes are those regulating the distribution of gov-
32. 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
33. 27 Stat. 531 (1893), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 1-16 (1970).
34. See: Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 299 (1969) (implying cause
of action for damages from the provision respecting the sale of real property in the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970)); Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United
States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967) (implying cause of action in the United States under the
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. (1970)); Wills v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961) (implying cause of action for compen-
satory and punitive damages from section 404(b) of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C.§ 1472 (1970)); Neiswonger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 35 F.2d 761 (N.D. Ohio
1929) (implying cause of action from federal regulations prescribing minimum flying
altitudes for aircraft); Roosevelt Field, Inc. v. Town of North Hempstead, 84 F. Supp.
456 (E.D.N.Y. 1949) (implying cause of action under Civil Aeronautics Board regula-
tions); Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947) (implying cause of ac-
tion under the Federal Communications Act for unlawfully intercepted telephone mes-
sage).
35. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
36. Section 27 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970), provides in part: "The district
courts of the United States ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this chap-
ter, or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law
brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or the rules and regula-
tions thereunder ......
37. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).
38. See generally L. Loss, SECURrMEs REGULATION 932-46 (1961), and L. Loss,
SECURITas REGULAnON 2880-2914 (1969).
39. Chicago & North Western Railway Co. v. United Transportation Union, 402
U.S. 570 (1971) (implying cause of action from section 2 First of the Railway Labor
Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152 First (1970)); Burke v. Compania Mexicana De Aviacion, S.A.,
433 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1970) (implying cause of action for reinstatement and damages
from § 2 Fourth of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152 Fourth (1970)); Steele v.
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), and Tunstall v. Brotherhood
of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944) (both holding that the Railway Labor Act,
45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1970), imposes on an exclusive bargaining representative the
duty of fair representation of all its members); Texas & New Orleans R. Co. v. Brother-
hood of Railway Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930) (implying cause of action from section 2
Third of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152 Third (1970)).
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ernment largess. 40 Still, not all suits for implied remedies have been
successful. 41 There can be no doubt that Congress has power under
the commerce clause to provide federal remedies for injured workers.
Whether it did so by implication in section 5 is discussed in Part II.
Statutory implication is not the only rationale whereby compensa-
tory relief for violations of section 5 might be awarded by a federal
court as a matter of federal law; remedial power may exist through
the power to create federal common law. Despite Justice Brandeis'
dictum in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins42 that "[t] here is no general
federal common law," 43 it is now clear that there are at least two dis-
tinct bases upon which federal courts may constitutionally create deci-
sional federal law.
One basis is a delegation of law-making power from Congress to
the federal courts. Although the Supreme Court suggested in Erie that
this power of delegation did not extend to all issues in cases within the
constitutional jurisdiction of the federal courts,44 the Court subse-
quently made clear at least that "Congress may prescribe how federal
courts are to conduct themselves with respect to subject matter over
which Congress plainly has power to legislate. '45 Since Congress
plainly has power to create private causes of action in employees who
40. Euresti v. Stenner, 40 U.S.L.W. 2653 (10th Cir. March 28, 1972) (implying pri-
vate cause of action to enforce provision in the Hill-Burton Act requiring adequate hos-
pital service for indigents, 42 U.S.C. § 291(a) (1970)); Norwalk Core v. Norwalk Re-
development Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that statute requiring any
urban renewal contract entered into by the Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment to include a provision compelling the other contracting party to furnish substi-
tute housing for displaced residents is enforceable by such displaced persons). See gener-
ally Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733 (1964).
41. Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963) (held no implied cause of action for
failure to comply with statute governing the issuance of subpoenas by congressional
committees); Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 341
U.S. 246 (1951) (held no implied cause of action under the Federal Power Act's prohibi-
tion against unreasonable rates, 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (1970)); Switchmen's Union of
North America v. National Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297 (1943) (held no implied
cause of action to review the National Mediation Board's choice of the appropriate bar-
gaining unit under section 2 Ninth of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152 Ninth
(1970)).
42. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
43. ld. at 78.
44. "Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable
in a State whether they be local in their nature, or "general," be they commercial law or
a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a
power upon the federal courts." Id.
45. Prima Paint Corporation v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405
(1967). The Court held that sections 2, 3, and 4 of the United States Arbitration Act of
1925, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1970), authorized the federal courts to create a rule making ar-
bitration clauses separable from contracts governed by the Act in suits for recission.
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are injured while working at jobs affecting commerce, it may delegate
to federal courts the power to create decisional law governing such
remedies.
The delegation argument has been successfully applied to special
jurisdictional provisions in particular statutes. The foremost example
is section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act, which states: "Suits for vio-
lation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization rep-
resenting employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in
this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought
in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the
parties. ... -46 The Supreme Court held in Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills 7 that this provision impliedly authorized the federal
courts to create a federal common law of collective bargaining con-
tracts: "the substantive law to apply in suits under § 301(a) is federal
law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national
labor law."' 48 On the other hand, a special jurisdictional provision in
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was held, in J. L Case Company
v. Borak, impliedly to create a private cause of action for violations of
that Act's proxy solicitation requirements rather than to delegate
common law power to the federal courts with respect to conduct cov-
ered by the Act.49 Although the 1970 Act does not contain a special
jurisdictional provision there is nothing to suggest that such a provi-
sion is essential to the delegation of common law power.
The second basis of federal common law is the protection of "essen-
tially federal" interests. In United States v. Standard Oil Co.50 the
Supreme Court stated: "although federal judicial power to deal with
common law problems was cut down ... [in some areas by Erie]
. . . that power remained unimpaired for dealing independently,
whenever necessary or appropriate, with essentially federal matters,
even though Congress has not acted affirmatively about the specific
question."51 Here, unlike the delegation-of-power basis of federal
common law, congressional intent to authorize decisional law is not
necessary. While the power of federal courts to protect essentially fed-
46. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
47. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
48. Id. at 456.
49. See note 36 and accompanying text, supra.
50. 332 U.S. 301 (1947). The Court held in this case that the right of the United
States to recover for injuries to a soldier was not governed by state law.
51. Id.at307.
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eral interests has been utilized in such undeniably national matters as
international relations52 and the interstate apportionment of navigable
streams,5 3 the power originated in a case involving the arguably less
important interests of the United States in its commercial paper.54 It
has been argued that these cases are explained by the doctrine of con-
stitutional preemption: federal courts should have law making power
in areas where state laws are preempted by express or implied grants
of federal authority. 55 If constitutional preemption is a necessary con-
dition for the exercise of common law power in the absence of a con-
gressional delegation, such power does not extend to the private en-
forcement of section 5 since states clearly are not preempted from
compensating injured workers. But the interpretation of these cases as
based on constitutional preemption is not accepted generally. 56 In
fact, the Supreme Court, in cases involving non-delegated common
law power, has emphasized not the vacuum that would exist if state
law was preempted, but rather the need for uniformity in whatever
law applies.57 Certainly uniformity will result from federal preemp-
tion. The compensation of injured workers presents an area, however,
in which uniformity can be achieved just as surely by leaving primary
responsibility to the states and intervening, through federal common
law, only where the recovery under state law is inadequate. Federal
common law remedial power should extend to cases in which the
essential uniformity is achieved interstitially as well as preemptively.
It is argued in Part II that the interest in assuring minimum levels of
workmen's compensation is essentially federal and, therefore, that this
basis of federal common law power should be utilized to enforce sec-
tion 5 in private suits for damages that would not be available under
local law.
The following section explores the differences in federal jurisdiction
which are dependent upon whether the source of the remedy is statu-
tory or judicial.
52. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
53. Hinderlider v. La Plata River Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
54. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
55. Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption,
67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024 (1967).
56. Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64
COLUM. L. REV. 805 (1964); D. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 679
(1968).
57. Uniformity was the sole reason advanced by the Court for its decision in the
leading case of Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). See generally
Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1512 (1969).
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B. Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction of the court is generally independent of the merits
of the plaintiffs claim. The principal exception to this rule is for
6laims which are "insubstantial"; insubstantiality is considered a juris-
dictional defect.58 Factual deficiencies in the plaintiff's case may
render the federal claim insubstantial, or the claim may be foreclosed
by the stare decisis effect of a prior decision by the Supreme Court or
the controlling court of appeals. The Supreme Court has made clear,
however, that a claim for damages caused by the violation of a federal
norm is not insubstantial. The leading case is Bell v. Hood,5 9 an ac-
tion brought in federal district court against a federal officer to re-
cover damages resulting from alleged violations of the fourth and fifth
amendments. Reversing a dismissal which has been entered for lack of
jurisdiction, the Court said: "Whether the complaint states a cause of
action on which relief could be granted is a question of law and just as
issues of fact it must be decided after and not before the court has
assumed jurisdiction over the controversy. '60
In Bell v. Hood, the Court did not distinguish between a claim that
the remedy exists by implication from the Constitution and a claim
that the remedy has its source in federal common law. In other con-
texts, however, it may be necessary to differentiate claims for implied
remedies from claims for judicially-created remedies. In private suits
to enforce section 5 of the 1970 Act, the distinction will determine
whether a minimum amount in controversy is required for federal ju-
risdiction and it may determine the collateral effects if the claim is
dismissed. These two consequences of the source of the remedy are
discussed in the following two subsections.
1. The Amount in Controversy
The jurisdiction of the federal district courts must be conferred by
Congress.61 Unlike many federal statutes62 the 1970 Act contains no
58. ALI STUDY, supra note 28, at 176.
59. 327 U.S. 678 (1946). The Supreme Court has recently answered, in the affirma-
tive, the question it left open in Bell: does the violation of the fourth amendment guar-
antee against unreasonable searches and seizures give rise to a federal cause of action
for damages? Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
60. Bell, 327 U.S. at 682.
61. "Courts created by statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute con-
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special jurisdictional provision which could fairly be construed to
create federal jurisdiction over private suits to enforce section 5.63
Therefore federal jurisdiction over such suits must result, if at all,
from the general statutory grants.
There are two general statutory grants of jurisdiction which may
apply to private suits to enforce section 5. One is 28 U.S.C. § 1337,
which gives the district courts original jurisdiction "of any civil action
or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating
commerce ...." The other is the broader grant of federal question
jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides in part: "The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000 exclusive
of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States."
The 1970 Act was enacted pursuant to Congress's power to regu-
late commerce,64 and although the Supreme Court has not yet dis-
cussed the scope of section 1337 it seems undeniable that the Act is
one "regulating commerce" within the meaning of that section. Thus,
if the plaintiff alleges that a private remedy is impliedly authorized by
section 5 such cause of action clearly is one "arising under" the 1970
Act, and the federal court would have jurisdiction under section 1337
without regard to the amount in controversy. Moreover, since the Act
is certainly a "law" of the United States within the meaning of section
1331, that section would furnish an alternative basis for jurisdiction
of suits for remedies allegedly implied under section 5 in which the
jurisdictional amount is present.
Suppose instead that the plaintiffs claim is based upon federal
common law, alleging either a congressional delegation of common
law power or that the interest to be vindicated is essentially federal.
The Supreme Court very recently held, in Illinois v. City of Milwau-
kee, 65 that "laws" in section 1331 includes federal common law. Thus
a suit for a judicially-created remedy "arises under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States" for purposes of section 1331.
fers." Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850).
62. E.g., section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
(1970).
63. Cf. 29 U.S.C. §§ 660(a), (c)(2), and 662(d) (Supp. 1971).
64. 29 U.S.C. § 65 1(b) (Supp. 1971).
65. 92S.Ct 1385 (1972).
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This explains why it was not necessary in Bell v. Hood to consider
whether a federal remedy for violations of the fourth amendment
would have been created by the Constitution or the courts; both
sources are within section 1331 and the jurisdictional amount was
present.Is a suit seeking a federal common law remedy for violation of sec-
tion 5 also one "arising under any Act of Congress regulating com-
merce" within the meaning of section 1337? Here the vague word
"laws" is not available to construe as in section 1331, and the pivotal
phrase becomes "arising under." Although case law on the meaning of
this phrase in section 1337 is scant,66 there is some authority67 which
suggests that "arising under" has the same meaning as similar phrases
in section 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1338,68 where case law is more
abundant. With respect to those sections, Justice Holmes' test that a
suit arises under the law which creates the cause of action69 (here,
federal common law rather than a congressional act) is sufficient
rather than necessary; sections 1331 and 1338 apparently encompass
suits for remedies created by state law wherein the only federal ques-
tion is the meaning or application of a federal statute.70 It is arguable
that a suit for damages caused by a violation of section 5 calls into
question the meaning or application of the Act so as to confer federal
jurisdiction under section 1337, even though the right to recover is
not created by that Act. 7'
66. The United States Supreme Court has never discussed the scope of section 1337.
The most recent court of appeals to do so said: "Jurisdiction under § 1337 does not
attach on the bare assertion that a right under an act regulating commerce is infringed.
Facts must be alleged to show that federal law in the particular cases creates a duty or
remedy." Russo v. Kirby, 453 F.2d 548, 551 (2d Cir. 1971).
67. McFaddin Express, Inc. v. Adley Corp., 346 F.2d 424, 425-26 (2d Cir. 1965)
(Friendly, J.).
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1970) provides in part: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents,
copyrights and trade-marks."
69. American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916);
Smith v. Kansas City Title Co., 255 U.S. 180, 213-15 (1921) (dissenting opinion).
70. Smith v. Kansas City Title Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921); DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351
U.S. 570 (1956). See T. B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964), and
AL! STUDY, supra note 28, at 178-79.
71. This assumes that causes of action exist only for violations of the Act. It is pos-
sible to argue that the federal courts should not be limited to remedying only violations
but should merely draw upon the Act for guidance in the exercise of their power to pro-
tect essentially federal interests, so that conduct which violated the spirit but not the
letter of the Act would be subject to remedial enforcement. But it is doubtful that a
court would go so far, especially when it can quite easily find that conduct which vio-
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Nevertheless there are two reasons to believe that even this interpre-
tation of "arising under" is not sufficient for jurisdiction under section
1337. The first is that, according to the doctrine of primary jurisdic-
tion,72 the question of whether the 1970 Act was violated must be re-
ferred to the regulatory mechanism established by the Act rather than
decided by the court in a civil suit.73 Thus the meaning or application
of the Act would not be an issue for the court to decide. Second, the
Supreme Court held in Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway74 that
the incorporation by reference of the Federal Safety Appliance Act7 5
into state tort law did not enable the federal court to take other than
diversity jurisdiction of suits brought to redress violations of that Act,
except where the injury occurred in interstate commerce, in which
cases the Federal Employers' Liability Act7 6 created a civil remedy.
The same reasoning should apply when a federal statute is incorpo-
rated by reference into federal common law: just as a state-created
claim based upon an intra-state violation of the Federal Safety Appli-
ance Act does not arise under the "laws" of the United States for pur-
poses of section 1331, neither should a judicially-created claim based
upon a violation of the 1970 Act or any federal statute arise under
"an Act of Congress regulating commerce" for purposes of section
1337. Judge Friendly recognized the possibility of a similar argument
with respect to section 1338, granting the district courts exclusive ju-
risdiction of suits "arising under any Act of Congress relating to pat-
ents, copyrights and trademarks," 77 when he said: "If this 'federal
common law' governed some disputed aspect of a claim to ownership
of a copyright or for the enforcement of a license, federal jurisdiction
might follow-though one would wish to consider whether this
might be founded on 26 U.S.C. § 1331 rather than § 1338 and thus
be concurrent and require a jurisdictional amount. ' 78 For these rea-
sons federal jurisdiction of private suits to redress violations of section
5 in the 1970 Act should be based only upon section 1331, and not
lates no standard nevertheless violates the employer's general duty in section 5(a)(1), 29
U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (Supp. 1971).
72. See generally L. JAFFE & N. NATHANSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS (639-97) (1968).
73. See notes 11-13 and accompanying text, supra.
74. 291 U.S. 205 (1934).
75. 27 Stat. 531 (1893), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-16(1070).
76. 45 U.S.C § 51 (1970).
77. See note 68, supra.
78. T. B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964).
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upon section 1337, if the alleged source of the remedy is federal
common law.
The effect .of relegating such suits to section 1331 is that the
amount in controversy must then exceed $10,000. This requirement
may have two effects. First, of course, it may help to insulate the
court from a flood of small claims. Some protection against inflated
claims is provided by the plaintiff's statutory liability for costs if he
ultimately recovers less than $10,000,79 although the effectiveness of
this provision has been questioned.8 0 Second, it may operate to pre-
clude, at the jurisdictional level, prospective private relief from viola-
tions of section 5; for example, decrees ordering the abatement of
hazardous conditions. The proper measure of the amount in contro-
versy in suits for specific relief is not clear.8 ' However, unless the
courts are to permit boundless speculation about the potential degree
of personal injury which might result from violations of section 5, the
proper measure in this case should be the cost to the defendant of
complying with the decree sought. Whether the source of a remedy is
statutory or judicial may in other cases determine whether the federal
court's jurisdiction is exclusive of the states'. In Borak, for example, if
the remedy for proxy violations had been created under federal
common law rather than implied from the statute, the provision
granting the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction of suits "to enforce
any liability or duty created by this title"8 2 apparently would not
apply and state courts could exercise concurrent jurisdiction. A sim-
ilar result would follow if the statute in question was one relating to
patents or copyrights.83
These differences in jurisdiction which are dependent upon the
source of the right to recover probably cannot be avoided, in suits to
recover less than the jurisdictional amount or to abate a violation of
the Act, by pleading both sources in the alternative, as permitted by
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. If the court finds
that the remedy sought exists, but only by implication from the stat-
ute, section 1337 would apply and no jurisdictional amount would be
necessary. Suppose, however, that the court finds that no implied
79. 28 U.S.C. § 133 1(b) (1970).
80. ALl STUDY, supra note 28, at 172-76.
81. C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 117-19 (1970).
82. See note 36, supra.
83. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1970) gives the federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction of
such suits. See text accompanying note 78, supra.
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cause of action exists but that the claim does lie as a matter of federal
common law. If the complaint sought less than $10,000 the court
would seem to be without jurisdiction to proceed. Of course the com-
plaint might be amended to pray for additional damages, but a similar
attempt was rejected by one court of appeals as showing that the
claim was not made with the requisite good faith.84 Thus a plaintiff
should not be able to create jurisdiction over a small claim for a
common law remedy by pleading an alternative statutory source.
2. The Effect of a Dismissal
If the court determines as a matter of law that a violation of section
5 does not give rise to an implied cause of action, or that it does not
entitle the plaintiff to relief as a matter of federal common law, should
its dismissal be for lack of jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim?
If the dismissal is for lack of jurisdiction the plaintiff is not barred by
the doctrine of res judicata from bringing his action in another, per-
haps more sympathetic, court with jurisdiction of the defendant; 85 this
is not true of a dismissal on the merits. Conversely, the federal court
has power to retain pendent jurisdiction of a parallel claim under state
law if the dismissal is for failure to state a claim but not if it is for lack
of jurisdiction 86 (although in practice the court is not likely to exercise
this power since the determination that no federal remedy exists
would probably be made before hearing other evidence). There may
be a difference in the characterization of the dismissal as between a
claim for an implied statutory remedy and a claim based on federal
common law.
With respect to a claim for an implied statutory remedy, whatever
doubt Bell v. Hood may have left about the form of dismissal of such
claims was dispelled in Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern
Public Service Co.,87 a suit for damages allegedly caused by the de-
fendant's violation of the prohibition in the Federal Power Act against
charging unreasonable rates. 88 In holding that no private cause of ac-
tion was implied from the statute, the Supreme Court said that "the
84. Arnold v. Troccoli, 344 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1965).
85. SeeNote, 48COLuM. L. REV. 1090, 1092 n.10(1948).
86. See id.; United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
87. 341 U.S. 246(1951).
88. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (1970).
644
Vol. 47: 629, 1972
Federal Common Law
mere claim confers power to decide that it has no merit, as well as to
decide that it has."'89 Accordingly the Court dismissed for failure to
state a claim.
Whether a claim based on federal common law must also be dis-
missed on the merits is less clear. Professors Hart and Wechsler
pointed out that the jurisdiction of a federal court and its power to
award the remedy sought may be equivalent. 90 For example, the
Norris-LaGuardia Act withdraws from the federal courts "jurisdiction
to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in
any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute ... ". 91 Up-
holding the constitutionality of the provision the Supreme Court said
simply that "there can be no question of the power of Congress thus to
define and limit the jurisdiction of the inferior courts of the United
States."92 It is arguable that there should be no distinction between the
express withdrawal by Congress of power to award a remedy and a
limitation on remedial power imposed by the Constitution. Thus, if a
court finds that it has power to award a common law remedy but that
the plaintiffs claim is faulty on its particular merits, the dismissal
would be for failure to state a claim. If, however, the court finds that
its power to create decisional law does not extend to the awarding of
the remedy sought-either because Congress attempted to delegate
such power with respect to a subject over which it did not have power
to legislate or because the interest sought to be protected is not essen-
tially federal-the dismissal of that claim would be for lack of juris-
diction, in which event the claim could be brought before another
court but would not alone empower the court to decide parallel state
claims.
Despite this argument, it is likely that a dismissal for lack of
common law power would be classified as being on the merits for
purposes of res judicata and pendent jurisdiction. The Supreme Court
has indicated its intention of preserving a sharp distinction between
jurisdictional power and remedial power. In Avco Corp. v. Aero
Lodge No. 73593 the Court held that a suit in a state court seeking an
89. 341 U.S. at 249.
90. H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
313-16 (1953).
91. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970).
92. Laufv. E. G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323,330 (1938).
93. 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
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antistrike injunction that under the Norris-LaGuardia Act would be
beyond the "jurisdiction" of the federal courts to grant nevertheless
could be removed to federal court and there dismissed on the merits:
"The nature of the relief available after jurisdiction attaches is, of
course, different from the question whether there is jurisdiction to
adjudicate the controversy. 9 4 Thus it appears that, regardless of
whether the dismissed claim is for a statutory or a judicial remedy, the
dismissal should be for failure to state a claim.
It may be helpful to summarize what has been said about federal
power to enforce section 5 of the 1970 Act in private actions. If the
remedy is alleged to be implied from the statute, jurisdiction is con-
ferred by section 1337 without regard to the amount in controversy.
If, on the other hand, the remedy is alleged to exist as a matter of fed-
eral common law, section 1331 is the sole source of jurisdiction,
thereby excluding claims for less than $10,000 and many suits to
abate hazards. Although either a statutory or a common law claim is
substantial for jurisdictional purposes until precluded by a controlling
decision in another case, it will not be possible to obtain a federal
common law remedy in suits where the jurisdictional amount is not
present merely by alleging a statutory remedy in the alternative. Fi-
nally, the dismissal of either claim must be on the merits if substantial,
so that res judicata bars the claim in other courts but permits pendent
jurisdiction of parallel state claims.
II. THE DUTY OF FEDERAL COURTS TO ENFORCE
SECTION 5
The central issue in a private suit in federal court to obtain relief
from violations of section 5 will be, of course, whether the remedy
sought should be awarded. Recall section 5:
(a) Each employer-
(1) shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place
of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are
causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his
employees;
(2) shall comply with occupational safety and health standards
promulgated under this Act.
94. Id. at 561.
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(b) Each employee shall comply with occupational safety and health
standards and all rules, regulations, and orders issued pursuant to this
Act which are applicable to his own actions and conduct.
Section 5 imposes three separate obligations: the employer's "gen-
eral duty"95 in section 5(a)(1) to provide the specified degree of safety
in employment; the employer's obligation in section 5(a)(2) to comply
with all occupational safety and health standards; and the employee's
obligation in section 5(b) to comply with standards and other regula-
tions. Potential plaintiffs may be divided into three classes: employers;
employees; and persons outside the employment relation in question,
such as guests, licensees, business invitees, and trespassers. Potential
remedies include: prospective relief, such as orders to comply with a
particular standard or to abate a hazard; compensatory damages for
injuries caused by the violation of the section; and even punitive dam-
ages for violations.9 6
Which of these several possible causes of action under section 5
should be held to exist as a matter of federal law? The extent to which
either the 1970 Act or federal common law permit private enforce-
ment of section 5 is the subject of this Part. The possibility of implied
statutory remedies is examined first.
95. This was the term used throughout the legislative hitory of the 1970 Act. E.g.,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 149. It is arguable that this choice of terminology
supports an inference that Congress intended that section 5 should be privately enforce-
able. In Hohfeldian terms, a "duty" is the correlative of a "right," and the latter is de-
fined as an "affirmative claim against another." W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL
CONCEPTIONS 60 (1923). By using the word "duty" Congress, it may be argued, intended
to create an "affirmative claim" in an employee injured by a violation of the provision.
A similar argument was relied upon in Burke v. Compania Mexicana De Aviacion,
S.A., 433 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1970), where the court implied a private cause of action
from a provision in the Railway Labor Act giving the majority of any craft of em-
ployees "the right to determine who shall be the representative of the craft .. " 45
U.S.C. § 152 Fourth (1970). One reason the court offered for its result was the use of
the word "right" in the statute. Yet the "right" to choose representatives is not a right in
the Hohfeldian sense, but a "power" through the exercise of which legal relations can be
changed. HOHFELD, supra, at 50. The impairment of a power is not necessarily action-
able; Congress, which created the power, could withdraw it with impunity. Still, the
court found that because Congress had used the term "right" it had intended a private
cause of action to exist for impairment by the employer.
It is highly desirable that Congress, and the courts, use language precisely and consist-
ently. In referring to conduct subject to private enforcement the term duty is appro-
priate; conduct enforceable criminally or in some manner other than privately might be
called an "obligation." Until that time, however, the use of a particular word should not
be relied upon as an indication of intention concerning private causes of action.
96. E.g., Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
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A. The Traditional Approach: Statutory Implication
In ascertaining whether a federal statute impliedly creates private
causes of action it does not expressly authorize, the obvious starting
point is the legislative history. The voluminous history of the 1970
Act contains few references to private suits and none that could be
considered relevant to the issue of implied remedies. 97 Although it is
possible to argue that if Congress had contemplated private enforce-
ment of section 5 there would be some mention of this fact, the dan-
gers of drawing conclusions from legislative silence have been well
documented. 98 Rather, in cases such as this where the legislative his-
tory is silent or ambiguous, the federal courts have created rules for
presuming the congressional intent from the fact of the Act.
The widely-followed general rule in suits for implied remedies,
which amounts to a presumption of affirmative Congressional intent,
was stated long ago by the Supreme Court in Texas and Pacific
Railway v. Rigsby:99 "A disregard of the command of the statute is a
wrongful act, and where it results in damage to one of the class for
whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover the
damages from the party in default is implied ... ." The first observa-
tion to be made about this rule is that it furnishes no help in implying
the availability of prospective relief. Implied prospective remedies
under the 1970 Act are unnecessary, however, in view of the provision
made in the Act for employees to request inspections by the Secretary
of Labor,100 to challenge the time fixed by the Secretary for abate-
ment,101 and to seek mandamus to compel the Secretary to investigate
or commence proceedings to abate an imminent danger.102
Applying the Rigsby special benefit rule to section 5, it is clear that
one class intended to be specially benefitted by the obligation imposed
on employers in section 5(a) consists of employees, in whose favor
Congress is presumed by this rule to have created an implied cause of
action for damages caused by the violation of the subsection. Consi-
derably more doubt, however, surrounds (1) the application of the
rule to the employee's obligation in section 5(b) and (2) the extent to
97. See notes 16 and 19 and accompanying text, supra.
98. H. HART & H. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1381-1401 (Tent. ed. 1958).
99. 241 U.S. 33, 39(1916).
100. 29 U.S.C. § 657(f) (Supp. 1971).
101. 29 U.S.C. § 659(c)(Supp. 1971).
102. 29 U.S.C. § 662(d) (Supp. 1971).
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which persons outside the employment relation are specially protected
by either section 5(a) or section 5(b).
Section 5(b) is something of an enigma, absent from the original
House version of the Act and even as enacted not expressly within the
power of the Secretary to enforce.103 Theoretically, the absence of an
express penalty should not prevent a conclusion that Congress in-
tended a statutory command to be privately enforced, and in fact the
courts have implied private remedies from such provisions in federal
statutes. 04 It is arguable that one class for whose special benefit sec-
tion 5(b) was enacted is that of a worker's fellow employees, who,
under Rigsby, would be presumed to have recourse against the worker
for damages caused by his violation of an occupational safety and
health standard. Another class arguably intended to benefit specially
by the subsection is employers, who might therefore argue by analogy
to the contributory negligence rule that an employee's violation of a
standard is a defense in a suit brought by that employee for damages
resulting from the employer's violation of another standard if compli-
ance by the employee would have averted the accident. Some support
for this argument is derived from the Act's characterization of the
responsibilities of employers and employees as "separate but depen-
dent."105
The special benefit rule yields only a presumption, however, which
may be rebutted by contrary inferences drawn from the legislative his-
tory or elsewhere. Both arguments based on applying the special ben-
efit rule to section 5(b)-the liability of a worker to his co-workers
and the employer's defense of a contributory violation-are forcefully
countered by the statement of the Senate Committee on labor and
Public Welfare: "The committee does not intend the employee-duty
provided in section 5(b) to diminish in any way the employer's com-
pliance responsibilities or his responsibility to assure compliance by
his employees."' 1 6 Although this statement was addressed to the ex-
press enforcement mechanism in the Act, it does express a clear policy
which is contrary to both arguments. First, it is clear that Congress
did not intend employee violations to be used as a defense of any sort
by employers. Second, it shows that the responsibility for employee
103. 29 U.S.C. §§ 658, 659 (Supp. 1971).
104. E.g., Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
105. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(2)(Supp. 1971).
106. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 150.
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violations was intended to rest primarily with the employer rather
than the employee. In short, the employee's obligation under section
5(b) is not privately enforceable either affirmatively or defensively,
but was inserted by the Senate as a cautionary device for the protec-
tion of the worker himself.
The second doubt raised by the application of the special-benefit
rule to section 5 centers on the extent to which persons outside the
employment relation-guests, licensees, business invitees, or tres-
passers-are specially protected by either the employer's obligation in
section 5(a) or the employee's obligation in section 5(b). To determine
whether this class is within the special benefit rule requires a more
thorough examination of the rule itself.
The phrase "especial benefit" is not free of ambiguity. Clearly ex-
cluded by this qualification are those "ideological"' 10 7 plaintiffs who
seek to enforce a statutory command, such as one requiring the pay-
ment of taxes, which presumably benefits all persons equally and the
violation of which injures all persons equally. At the other extreme,
the qualification clearly includes plaintiffs seeking redress for actual
injuries caused by the breach of such provisions as the proxy solicita-
tion requirements in Borak, which primarily protect only certain per-
sons including the plaintiff. But what if the statute, like the tax stat-
utes, benefits all persons equally so long as it is obeyed, but, like the
proxy rules, may result in specific personal injury when violated? That
is the description of section 5 insofar as it protects persons outside the
employment relation. It is true that employees are more likely than
other persons to be injured by statutory violations, but unlike the
proxy rules (protecting shareholders) it is possible for anyone to be
injured by a violation of section 5. The issue seems to be whether the
plaintiff must have been in a special position before the violation oc-
curred (by being a member of an identifiable class for whose primary
protection the statute was enacted) or whether the qualification is sat-
isfied if the plaintiff is in a special position after a violation has oc-
curred (as a result of special injury).
The interpretation requiring merely special injury appears generally
preferable since it would not discriminate among those injured by the
violation of the statute. Under this construction of the special benefit
107. See Jaffee, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or
Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033 (1968).
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rule, both employees and third persons would be presumed entitled to
recover damages caused by the violation of section 5(a). It may be
argued that this presumption is overcome by the regulations which
have been promulgated under the 1970 Act, which state: "In the event
a standard protects on its face a class of persons larger than employ-
ees, the standard shall be applicable under this part only to employees
and their employment and places of employment."'108 The purpose of
this regulation is not clear. It is unlikely that it is addressed to the
question of implied remedies and the special benefit rule, for no refer-
ence is made to private enforcement. Instead, the more reasonable
interpretation is that the regulation is simply a poorly worded restate-
ment of one limitation on the scope of the Act, that the standards do
not govern conduct or conditions which occur outside a business con-
text. Therefore the special benefit rule supports a presumption that
Congress intended the employer's obligation in section 5(a) to be pri-
vately enforceable by any person injured by the violation of the
subsection.
Can the presumption that section 5(a) was intended to be privately
enforceable for damages be overcome? Unlike section 5(b), there is
nothing in the legislative history which might nullify the presumption;
counterarguments must be drawn from other sources. The two coun-
terarguments most frequently made are based upon (1) negative infer-
ences drawn from the express creation of certain, private remedies and
(2) the effect given by courts to similar language in other statutes.
The first counterargument is based on the venerable maxim ex-
pressio unius exclusio alterius: the express creation of certain remedies
evidences an intention to deny all others. This argument might be
made under the 1970 Act. In section 11 (c), employers are prohibited
from discriminating against employees who participate in the enforce-
ment of the Act, and the federal district courts are given jurisdiction,
in suits brought by the Secretary of Labor, to grant "all appropriate
relief' including reinstatement with back pay to enforce the subsec-
tion.109 It is possible to argue that section 11 (c) demonstrates Con-
gress considered the redress of employee injuries but decided to create
a federal remedy on behalf of employees only in that particular case.
A sufficient answer to this argument is provided by another maxim
108. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.5(d), appearing in 36 Fed. Reg. 10468 (1971).
109. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(2) (Supp. 1971).
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with opposite effect, ejusdem generis: the enumeration of certain rem-
edies implies an intention to create additional remedies of a similar
nature. Indeed, a nearly identical provision in the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act" 0 has been held to be privately enforceable for damages.1 1'
Thus it would appear not only that section 11 (c) is no obstacle to im-
plied remedies under section 5 but that it may itself be privately en-
forceable.
The second argument often urged in determining congressional
intent with respect to the enforceability of a statutory provision is
based upon the extent to which similar provisions in other statutes
have been held to create implied causes of action. Congress, it is
argued, must have intended similar effect to be given to the statute in
question. Obligations similar to that of section 5 appear in the Long-
shoremen's Act,112 the Walsh-Healy Act, 113 and the Service Contracts
Act.114 The Longshoremen's Act must be disregarded, for that provi-
sion merely restated the duty owed under admiralty law which tradi-
tionally has been enforceable in federal courts independently of the
statute. 115 Likewise, the provisions in the Walsh-Healy Act and the
Service Contracts Act shed no light on section 5 since apparently no
court has faced the issue of whether they are privately enforceable. In
suits for implied remedies under other provisions of the Walsh-Healy
Act, however, the courts have stated in dicta that no private cause of
action exists under any provision of that Act. 1 6 This is hardly support
for the proposition that Congress intended section 5 not to be pri-
vately enforceable. In any event, Congress' failure to react to judicial
interpretations of statutory language does not necessarily indicate its
approval.117
The presumption that Congress intended section 5(a) to be enforce-
able for damages by employees or third persons, created by applying
110. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1970). Although, unlike the comparable provision in the
1970 Act, this provision does not expressly authorize the Secretary to seek personal re-
lief for the aggrieved employee and thus might appear distinguishable, the Supreme
Court has held that lost wages may be included in the relief sought by the Secretary.
Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960).
11I. Fagot v. Flintkote Company, 305 F. Supp. 407 (E.D. La. 1969).
112. 33 U.S.C. § 941 (1970).
113. 41 U.S.C. § 35(e) (1970).
114. 41 U.S.C. § 351(a)(3) (1970).
115. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917); G. GILMORE & C. BLACK,
THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY (1957).
116. United States v. W. H. Kistler Stationery Co., 200 F.2d 805, (10th Cir. 1952).
117. See note 98, supra.
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the Rigsby special benefit rule to the statutory language, stands unre-
butted. But is the rule itself appropriate to its purpose? It is submitted
that it is not.
B. The Role of Federal Common Law
Rigsby was decided more than twenty years before Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins, while the federal courts were still exercising unre-
strained power to create and apply their own rules of common law. If a
federal court of that era were to borrow a doctrine from local tort law
and apply it as a matter of federal common law, its power to do so
would have gone unquestioned. That is exactly what happened in
Rigsby. The authority relied upon by the Rigsby Court consisted of
English cases holding that a criminal statute merely set the standard
of conduct required of the defendant by the statutory tort doctrine. 118
The rationale of that doctrine, however, is not that the statute creates
the private remedy by implication, but that the defendant will not be
heard to argue that his judgment about the proper standard of con-
duct takes precedence over that of the legislature. "When the com-
munity has thus officially determined that certain risks are foreseeable
and are reasonably to be avoided by taking a prescribed precaution,
no reasonable man would thereafter omit the precaution, so there is
no room for jury judgment in the matter."'1 19 Thus a rule of common
law negligence has gradually been distorted into a device for pre-
suming what Congress "would have intended on a point not present to
its mind, if the point had been present."'120
Courts in recent years are beginning to move away from the special
benefit rule and its correlative reliance on congressional intent. A
paradigm case was Brown v. Bullock,'2 ' where the court said: "Im-
plied rights of action are not contingent upon statutory language
which affirmatively indicates that they are intended. On the contrary,
118. For example, one case cited by the Court in Rigsby was Couch v. Steel, 3 El. &
BI. 402, 23 L. J. Q. B. 121 (1854), in which Lord Campbell stated that "the plaintiff's
right, by the common law, to maintain an action on the case for special damage sus-
tained by the breach of a public duty is not taken away by reason of the statute which
creates the duty imposing a penalty recoverable by a common informer for neglect to
perform it ..." 3 El. & BI. at 415 (emphasis added).
119. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 998 (1956).
120. J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 173 (1963 ed.).
121. 194 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), affd 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961).
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they are implied unless the legislation evidences a contrary intention. 1 22
A less dogmatic and more authoritative test was recently enunci-
ated by the Supreme Court in Chicago and North Western Railway
Company v. United Transportation Union: "Our cases reveal that
where the statutory language and legislative history are unclear, the
propriety of judicial enforcement turns on the importance of the duty
in the scheme of the Act, the capacity of the courts to enforce it effec-
tively, and the necessity for judicial enforcement if the right of the
aggrieved party is not to prove illusory."123
In moving away from reliance on congressional intent, however,
the courts have continued to cling to the view that the remedy has its
source in the statute. A more candid assessment of the cases would
lead to the conclusion that the source of the remedy is often not statu-
tory but judicial. In the words of the late Justice Harlan: "The notion
of 'implying' a remedy, therefore, as applied to cases like Borak, can
only refer to a process whereby the federal judiciary exercises a choice
among traditionally available judicial remedies according to reasons
related to the substantive social policy embodied in an act of positive
law." 124
A judicial source has important advantages in the private enforce-
ment of section 5. If a federal remedy were implied for the violation of
section 5(a), the indiscriminate displacement of state workmen's com-
pensation systems would create an intolerable disruption of federal-
state relations. Every employee whose injuries were traceable to a vio-
lation of that subsection could bypass local workmen's compensation
procedures and recover his damages in federal court. On the other
hand, the adequacy of workmen's compensation laws is increasingly
being questioned.1 25 Indeed, the 1970 Act created a national commis-
sion to investigate "State workmen's compensation laws in order to
122. Brown, 194 F. Supp. at 224.
123. 402 U.S. 570, 578 (1971), The Court held that the Union's obligation under the
Railway Labor Act "to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements
concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions," was enforceable in a private
suit for an anti-strike injunction. See 45 U.S.C. § 152 First (1970).
124. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 403 n. 4 (1971) (Harlan, J. concurring) (italics in oiiginal).
125. See, e.g., Bernstein, The Need for Reconsidering the Role of Workmen's Com-
pensation, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 992 (1971). The author cites the following problems with
the present system: wide gaps between workmen's compensation awards and actual
losses; high and increasing operating costs of present programs; the increasing propor-
tion of workers employed in occupations designed for workmen's compensation cover-
age, accompanied by the decreasing proportion of personal injuries that are job-related;
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determine if such laws provide an adequate, prompt, and equitable
system of compensation for injury or death arising out of or in the
course of employment.' 26 In order to meet the varying defects in
local compensation laws without displacing those laws in areas where
they are effective, the federal court must have a flexibility to adjust
and condition its remedies which the statutory implication rationale
does not provide.
The necessary flexibility is provided by federal common law. Two
bases were noted in Part I for judicially-created federal law: (1) dele-
gation of power from Congress and (2) protection of essentially fed-
eral interests. Just as it is unrealistic under the 1970 Act to found pri-
vate remedies upon inferences that Congress intended to create the
particular remedy sought, so it is unrealistic to infer a delegation of
common law power. There is simply no evidence of such an intent. If
private remedies for violations of section 5(a) are to be awarded as a
matter of federal common law, the power of federal courts to do so
must be based upon the protection of essentially federal interests.
Is the compensation of injured employees an essentially federal in-
terest? The answer to that question must be no; centuries of local con-
trol over compensation for job-related injuries attest to that. But that
is a different question than to ask whether it is essentially in the fed-
eral interest to ensure that job-related injuries are adequately compen-
sated. To that question the 1970 Act provides an emphatically affirm-
ative answer. The Act states: "The Congress finds that personal inju-
ries and illnesses arising out of work situations impose a substantial
burden upon, and are a hindrance to, interstate commerce in terms of
lost production, wage loss, medical expenses, and disability compensa-
tion payments.' 127 The availability of private federal remedies will
certainly aid in deterring violations of section 5 and thus in preventing
these burdens upon commerce. The deterrent aspect of private relief is
not the only federal interest; Congress was also concerned about the ade-
quacy of compensation for injuries caused by violations after they
have occurred. The Act declares "that the full protection of American
workers from job-related injury or death requires an adequate,
difficulties in determining whether such injuries as heart attacks are job-related; the dis-
tortion in costs and benefits caused by the current tendency to compensate chronic,
non-work-related illnesses out of workmen's compensation funds; and the greater ad-
verse affect of injury and illness on poorer workers.
126. 29 U.S.C. § 676(a)(2) (Supp. 1971).
127. 29 U.S.C. § 651(a) (Supp. 1971).
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prompt, and equitable system of workmen's compensation as well as
an effective program of occupational health and safety regulation."12 8
In short, federal law is to provide a backstop for the compensation
laws of the several states.
The backstop principle was written into the Act's mechanism for
public enforcement. Procedures are provided whereby the individual
states may reassume the enforcement responsibility presently exercised
by the Secretary of Labor if the local plan "will be at least as effective
in providing safe and healthful employment and places of employ-
ment" 129 as the standards promulgated by the Secretary. 130 Moreover,
although the employer is relieved of the obligation in section 5(a)(2)
to comply with parallel federal standards after a state plan has been
approved, the Act carefully avoids also relieving him of his general
duty in section 5(a)(1).131 This residuum of federal obligation lends
further support to invoking the backstop principle as a matter of fed-
eral common law for the protection of all persons injured by viola-
tions of section 5(a) where compensation is shown to be inadequate
under local law.
The remedial flexibility afforded by federal common law will also
permit the courts to establish both procedural and substantive limita-
tions and conditions on the federal cause of action. In this way the
courts might treat some third persons injured by violations differently
than others as circumstances warrant, and might occasionally award
prospective relief when the statutory provisions for abatement appear
inadequate.
CONCLUSION
The thesis of this comment is that, while the power of federal
courts to enforce federal statutes in manners not expressly authorized
has long been recognized, the source of this power has received insuf-
ficient attention. Whether the source of the remedy is the statute itself
or federal common law often will determine the scope of federal juris-
128. 29 U.S.C. § 676(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 1971).
129. 29 U.S.C. § 667(c)(2) (Supp. 1971).
130. 29 U.S.C. § 667 (Supp. 1971).
131. 29 U.S.C. § 667(e) (Supp. 1971). Similarly, the employee is not relieved of
his duty in section 5(b) by the approval of a state plan. Id. This residual obligation
is less significant than that of the employer, however, in view of the largely precatory
nature of section 5(b). See notes 103-106 and accompanying text, supra.
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diction and the court's flexibility in shaping and conditioning relief.
Where a statute contains an incidental requirement, specific in content
and limited in scope, the remedy can reasonably be held to exist by
implication from the statute. Congress, if it had considered the ques-
tion, would have assumed that the courts would give it effect. Such
incidental provisions, moreover, are rarely of sufficient importance to
be characterized as essentially federal for purposes of federal common
law. An example of such a provision for which a private remedy might
reasonably be implied in the 1970 Act is the anti-discrimination provi-
sion in section 11 (c). Where, however, as in section 5, the obligation is
central to the statutory scheme and would infringe other interests if
subject to indiscriminate private enforcement, it is less likely that
Congress intended to create such wholesale remedies. Yet obligations
such as these are more likely to protect essentially federal interests.
Remedial flexibility is assured by candidly recognizing that the source
of the remedy exists in federal common law.
Robert G. Mullendore*
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